By Ian Kelly, a U.S. ambassador to Georgia from 2015 to 2018, and David J. Kramer, executive director of the George W. Bush Institute.
This month marks the 13th anniversary of Russia’s invasion of Georgia, a country of 3.7 million people wedged between Russia and Turkey. For decades, Georgia has been the most pro-Western and pro-American country in the region. Its top foreign-policy priority is to join the European Union and NATO, and it has answered nearly every call from both organizations to serve in peacekeeping and combat missions.
This month marks the 13th anniversary of Russia’s invasion of Georgia, a country of 3.7 million people wedged between Russia and Turkey. For decades, Georgia has been the most pro-Western and pro-American country in the region. Its top foreign-policy priority is to join the European Union and NATO, and it has answered nearly every call from both organizations to serve in peacekeeping and combat missions.
Several dozen Georgians made the ultimate sacrifice while serving side by side with U.S. troops in Iraq and Afghanistan. In addition to serving as a security asset for the United States, Georgia is strategically important as the Black Sea outlet of the only economically viable East-West trade route that does not transit Russia or Iran.
Keen to join the Euro-Atlantic community, Georgia has also stood out in its region for having made the most progress toward democracy. That progress is now threatened by the ruling party, Georgian Dream, which seems more intent on seizing all reins of power than on meeting Western standards of governance. It also appears to be strengthening its ties to Russia and even Belarus.
In 2019, Georgian Dream leaders invited a Russian lawmaker to address the Georgian legislature, leading to outrage and unrest in the streets.
In 2019, Georgian Dream leaders invited a Russian lawmaker to address the Georgian legislature, leading to outrage and unrest in the streets. It torpedoed two projects that would have increased Georgia’s independence from Russia, one a deep-water port on the Black Sea and the other a new East-West corridor of fiber optic cable.
Some in Georgian Dream are carrying out what amounts to state capture, concentrating power and wealth in the hands of a small group of elites, at a time when the coronavirus pandemic is raging in the country and hurting the economy, with GDP dropping by 6.2 percent last year. Georgia has recorded a half million cases and more than 6,500 dead, a positivity rate of 10.4 percent, and only seven percent of the population is fully vaccinated.
Borrowing a page from the playbook of illiberal regimes like those in Moscow and Minsk, Tbilisi has also begun lashing out at the West. In late 2019, Facebook removed fake accounts, all traced to Georgian Dream, that expressed anti-Western sentiments, some of which were specifically anti-American. More recently, websites and social media accounts linked to Georgian Dream have launched unprecedented attacks on the U.S. ambassador in Tbilisi and her European colleagues any time they have voiced criticism of Georgian Dream or the government, in an effort to silence such criticism.
Georgia’s political crisis came to a head last fall, when opposition parties challenged parliamentary elections, alleging the Georgian Dream government engaged in voter manipulation and fraud. While there is little doubt that Georgian Dream received more votes than any other party, many have questioned whether it got enough—40 percent—to form a government without having to form a coalition. While most international observers called the fall elections competitive, most analysts agree that Georgian Dream has been seeking to marginalize opposition forces, monopolize power, and control the judiciary.
The opposition’s decision to boycott the parliament sparked a political crisis that the government then made worse in February by arresting and jailing Nika Melia, the leader of United National Movement, the main opposition party. Many in the opposition also charged that the prosecution of Giorgi Rurua, the majority owner of pro-opposition TV channel Mtavari Arkhi, was politically motivated.
In early July, right-wing demonstrators ran amok on the day of a planned LGBTQ Pride rally, attacking journalists and civil society offices.
In April, the European Union intervened to strike an agreement defusing the political crisis, at least temporarily, and leading to Melia’s release. In addition to calling for amnesty for “political prisoners,” the agreement called for early parliamentary elections if Georgian Dream failed to secure 43 percent of the vote in upcoming local elections. But then, in early July, right-wing demonstrators ran amok on the day of a planned LGBTQ Pride rally, attacking journalists and civil society offices. Some of the demonstrators had links to Moscow, and they were encouraged by the Georgian Orthodox Church, which maintains ties to its Russian counterpart.
More than 50 journalists were injured, and one died several days after being brutally beaten. Prime Minister Irakli Garibashvili blamed the “radical opposition” for instigating the clash. His failure to prevent and condemn the violence contributed to ongoing tensions between supporters of the Pride March and journalists on one side and counter-demonstrators on the other. The U.S. Ambassador in Tbilisi slammed Garibashvili for lack of “forceful leadership” in handling the homophobic and anti-media violence.
